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Appellants John Noble and Cedar Ridge Homes, Inc. (collectively "Cedar Ridge 
Homes") submit this Supplemental Reply Brief in response to the arguments set forth by the 
Kootenai County Board of Commissioners ("Board") in its Supplemental Brief of Respondents 
filed in this matter. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cedar Ridge Homes appeals to this Court form the district court's decision affirming the 
Kootenai County Board of Commissioner's denial of Cedar Ridge Homes' application for 
residential subdivision. Cedar Ridge Homes filed its Appellants' Brief with this Court on 
September 24, 2008. The Board filed its Respondents' Brief on October 24, 2009 and Cedar 
Ridge Homes filed its Reply Brief on ~ovember  12,2008. 
Following the completion of the briefing in this matter, but prior to the case being set for 
oral argument, the Board filed a Motion for Leave to Augment its Respondents' Brief with the 
Court. The Board's Motion for Leave to Augment requested that the Court grant it leave to 
conduct additional briefing in this matter in light of the Court's issuance of its substitute opinion 
in Akers v. Mortensen, 2009 WL 198272 (2009), limited to an analysis of the site visit conducted 
by the Board. Cedar Ridge Homes filed its "No Objection to Respondents' Motion for Leave to 
Augment Brief' with this Court on February 10,2009. 
On February 25, 2009, the Court entered its Order Granting Motion for Leave to 
Augment Brief. On or about March 25, 2009, the Board filed its Supplemental Brief of 
Respondents. This Supplemental Reply Brief is submitted by the Appellants pursuant to the 
Court's February 25, 2009 Order Granting Motion for Leave to Augment Brief, and in response 
to the arguments set forth in the Board's Supplemental Brief of Respondents. 
Last, it should be noted that both the Board's Supplemental Brief of Respondents, and 
this Supplemental Rely Brief are limited, per this Court's February 25, 2009 Order, to the sole 
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issue of whether Cedar Ridge Homes' substantial due process rights were violated under Idaho 
Code i j  67-5279(4) by the Board's May 22, 2007 site visit. With respect to all the other issues 
raised on appeal, Cedar Ridge Homes relies upon the arguments and authorities set forth in its 
Appellants' Brief filed on September 24,2008, and its Reply Brief filed on November 12,2008. 
11. SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT 
In its appellate briefing to this Court, Cedar Ridge Homes argued that the Board violated 
its substantial due process rights, and thus violated Idaho Code i j  67-5279(4), by conducting a 
site visit of the proposed subdivision site on May 22, 2007, wherein the Board (1) did not afford 
Cedar Ridge Homes' representatives the opportunity to be present in any meaningful way; and 
(2) did not afford Cedar Ridge Homes the opportunity to rebut facts derived from the site visit. 
(Appellants' Brief, pp.34-37); (Appellants' Reply Brief, pp. 15-19). 
In its Respondent's Brief, the Board originally argued that this Court should apply its 
holding in the recent case of Akers v. Mortensen, 2008 WL 2266993 (2008) to the facts of this 
case to establish that no substantial due process rights of Cedar Ridge Homes were prejudiced by 
the Board's May 22, 2007 site visit. (Respondent's Brief, pp.24-30). Specifically, the Board 
argued that if the principles of Akers were applied to the facts of this case, then "any statements 
made by the Board would be in the form of deliberations, rather than testimony which an 
applicant would properly have the opportunity to rebut." (Respondents' Brief, p.25). Cedar 
Ridge Homes responded to the Board's argument in its Reply Brief by arguing that this Court's 
decision in Akers v. Mortensen, 2008 W L  2266993 (2008) was distinguishable from the case at 
hand. (Appellants' Reply Brief, pp. 15-1 9). 
Akers v. Mortensen, 2008 WL 2266993 (2008) was subsequently withdrawn by the Court 
in favor of the Substitute Opinion of Akers v. Mortensen, 2009 WL 198272 (2009). Although 
the Board no longer relies up upon the withdrawn opinion of Akers v. Mortensen, 2008 WL 
CEDAR RIDGE HOMES' SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF: 2 
2266993 (2008), the argument set forth by the Board in its Supplement Brief of Respondents is 
similar to that previously set forth by the Board. Namely, the Board argues that this Court's 
holdings in Tyson Creek R. Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 31 Idaho 580, 174 P. 1004 (1918); Uhrig v. 
Cofin, 72 Idaho 271, 240 P.2d 480 (1952), and Lobdell v. State ex rel. Bd. of Highway 
Directors, 89 Idaho 559, 407 P.2d 135 (1965) regarding viewings by judges or juries in a trial 
setting should be expressly extended to viewings of proposed used sites conducted by the Board. 
(Supp. Br. of Respondents, pp.2-9). However, because this Court has already clearly established 
the requirements a local zoning body must comply with to satisfy due process in the context of a 
site viewing of a proposed use site, and because the cases relied upon by the Board are 
distinguishable from the matter at hand, the Board's argument in this respect fails. 
A. The Idaho Supreme Court cases of Comer v. County of Twin Falls, and Eacret v. 
Bonner County address due process requirements in the context of a site visit 
conducted by a local zoning body, and are controlling in this case. 
In its supplemental briefing, the Board cites to, and relies upon, several cases which 
address a district court judges' viewing of a premises in a trial setting and requests that this Court 
apply the same to the facts of this case to find that Cedar Ridge Homes due process rights were 
not prejudiced by the Board's actions during its May 22,2007 site visit. However, where a local 
zoning body views a proposed use site in a land use matter, this Court has already established the 
requirements the local zoning body must comply with to satisfy due process in Comer v. County 
of Twin Falls, 130 Idaho 433,942 P.2d 557 (1997) and Encret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 
86 P.3d 494 (2004). The due process requirements set forth by the Court in these cases are 
controlling in this matter. 
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Under Idaho law, decisions by a zoning board are subject to due process requirements. 
See e.g., Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 784, 86 P.3d 494, 498 (2004) (holding that 
"[d]ecisions by a zoning board applying general rules or specific policies to specific individuals, 
interest or situations are quasi-judicial in nature and subject to due process constraints"). This 
Court addressed due process requirements pertaining to a site visit of a proposed use site by a 
local zoning body in Comer v. County ofTwin Falls, 130 Idaho at 439-40,86 P.3d at 563-64. 
In Comer, the issue before the Court was whether the Twin Falls County Board of 
Commissioners violated the Appellants' due process rights when it viewed the property in 
question without notice and without giving the parties or their representatives the opportunity to 
be present. Id. at 439, 86 P.3d at 563. This Court expressly held that the Appellants' due 
process rights had been violated by the Twin Falls County Board of Commissioner's failure to 
provide them the opportunity to be present at the site viewing: 
We hold that before a local zoning body, whether it be the Commission or the 
Board, views a parcel of property in question, it must provide notice & the 
opportunity to be present to the parties. 
Id. (emphasis added). In reaching its holding, the Court set forth the rationale behind its 
decision to require local zoning bodies to provide the opportunity to be present to parties during 
a site visit: 
First, notice to the parties provides them with an opportunity to contest the 
propriety of such a viewing under the particular circumstances .... More 
importantly, notice to the parties provides them with an opportunity to be present 
at the time of the inspection, which in turn will insure that the [board] does not 
mistakenly view the wrong object orpremises. 
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Highbarger v. Thornock, 94 Idaho 829,83 1,498 P.2d 1302, 1304 
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More recently, in Eacvet, this Court further expounded upon the rationale behind 
requiring a local zoning body to provide all parties and their representatives an opportunity to be 
present. In that case, this Court provided that the opportunity to be present provides all parties 
with "the opportunity to rebut facts derived from the visit that may come to bear on the ultimate 
decision. . . ." Eacret, 139 Idaho at 786, 86 P.3d at 500. In so stating, the Court cited to, and 
relied upon, its earlier precedent set in Comer. Id. Thus, this Court has made clear that an 
opportunity to be present at a site visit conducted by a zoning body is required (1) to insure that 
the zoning body does "not mistakenly view the wrong object or premises," and (2) to provide the 
parties with the opportunity to rebut facts derived by the zoning body from the visit. Comer, 130 
Idaho at 439, 86 P.3d at 563; Eacvet, 139 Idaho at 786, 86 P.3d at 500. Where a meaningful 
opportunity to be present is denied by a local zoning body, the rationale's behind the rule are 
frustrated, and due process violations result. 
In this case, the Board's May 22, 2007 site visit of the proposed subdivision site was for 
the purpose of adducing evidence squarely pertinent to their Order of Decision; namely, the 
surveyed location of the boundaries separating the Meadow (i.e., the no-build open space), the 
building envelopes, and the approved drainfields locations. (Agency Tr., pp.81-111). Indeed 
the Board's site visit included voluminous discussions pertaining to the same. (Agency Tr., 
pp.81-111). However, the Board frustrated the rationale set forth by this Court in Comer and 
Eacret by failing to provide Cedar Ridge Homes' representatives any meaningful opportunity to 
be present during the site visit. 
The Board's position on this matter is simple: Cedar Ridge Homes "should not be heard 
to complain that they were not afforded the opportunity to observe the Board and listen to 
comments of its members when it was the choice of CRH's gathered representatives not to do 
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so." (Respondent's Brief, p.21). The Board's argument that Cedar Ridge Homes voluntarily 
chose not to attend the site visit is disingenuous. The facts establish that Cedar Ridge Homes 
"chose" to attend ihe site visit, but was precluded from doing so by the affirmative bad faith 
steps taken by the Board to preclude Cedar Ridge Homes' representatives from attending, 
observing, or otherwise partaking in the public hearing. 
Prior to the Board's arrival to Cedar Creek Ranch Estates on May 22,2007, Cedar Ridge 
Homes' representatives made certain preparations in anticipation of the Board's arrival, 
including opening a gate and a fenced area at the front of the property (at the front of the 
Meadow) to create an entrance to the property. (R., p.40, 74). However, when the Board 
approached the designated entrance in its van, the Board observed the people gathered near the 
same, and accelerated to leave the scene. (R.  4 7 6  Mark Mussman, the County Planner, 
pointed out the Meadow where Cedar Ridge Homes' representatives were assembled and directs 
the Board to go on past it: 
BY MARK MUSSMAN: Okay, there is the meadow. We'll just go on past it. 
That's the meadow. 
(Agency Tr., p.87) (emphasis added); (R., p.41, 77). As a result, the Board bypassed the 
designated entrance and entered the property at some unknown location, and ignored the public 
gathered at the front of the Meadow to take part in the site visit. 
The Board continued on to the far end of the 120-acre property, far out of sight or hearing 
of the public (including Cedar Ridge Homes' representatives) that had assembled to take part in 
the public hearing, and entered the property at some unknown location. (R., p.41, 77). 
Thereafter, the Board again drove past the group assembled to partake in the public hearing. (R., 
p.41, 79); (Agency Tr., p.106). One of the members of the Board or its staff suggested stopping, 
and was advised against it: 
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MARK MUSSMAN: Spectators down at the comer. (Agency Tr., p. 105) 
BY UNKNOWN: Why don't we park here just too [sic] . . . ? 
BY JOHN CAFFERTY: You don't want to get out here. 
BY MARK MUSSMAN: No, not really. Because people will ask you questions. 
BY UNKNOWN: No, that's a - you need to say it - you need to make that 
statement real quick like. I want to look (inaudible). 
(Agency Tr., p.106). As a result, the Board drove up the road and parked to continue the site 
visit, out of audible range. (R., p.41,79); (Agency Tr., p.106). Now that the Board was within a 
reasonable distance from the public group assembled to partake in the hearing (although still not 
in audible range), the Board took hrther affirmative steps to preclude the public from attending. 
(R., pp.41-42, 710). Namely, it was at this point that the County Planner, Mark Mussman, 
approached the assembled group and informed them to stay away from the Board. (R., pp.41- 
42, 710). Mr. Mussman stated that the Board did not want anyone joining them or approaching 
them. (R., pp.41-42,710). 
Soon thereafter, the Board leR. (R., p.42,711). The group that assembled to attend and 
partake in the public hearing, including Cedar Ridge Homes' representatives, never heard a word 
of the Board's discussions, inquiries, or comments, nor were they given the opportunity to know 
the nature or content of the evidence adduced by the Board during the site visit. (R., p.42, 711). 
As a result of the Board's actions, Cedar Ridge Homes had no way of knowing whether 
the Board "mistakenly viewed the wrong objects," such as the various survey markers marking 
the boundaries between the Meadow (i.e., the no-build open space), the building envelopes, and 
the approved drainfields locations. See e.g., Comer, 130 at 439, 86 P.3d at 563 (holding, "notice 
to the parties provides them with an opportunity to be present at the time of the inspection, which 
in turn will insure that the [Board] does not mistakenly view the wrong object orpremises"). 
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The Board was obviously confised and mistaken about the survey markers (orange, pink, 
and blue flags) placed throughout the property by engineer Russ Helgeson on behalf of Cedar 
Ridge Homes to delineate the respective boundaries of the Meadow, the building envelopes, and 
the approved drainfield locations. (R., p.40, 75). A review of the site visit transcript establishes 
that the Board erroneously speculated and mistakenly guessed at the significance of the various 
survey markers: 
BY JAY LOCKHART: This one is color coded. They have it flagged out there 
with orange, pink and blue flags. To kinda delineate the boundary of the no build 
zone drainage and where the structure is -the building envelopes are. 
(Agency Tr., p.88). 
. . . 
BY CHAIRMAN CURRIE: Okay, Jay, uh according to the map, those yellow 
stakes uh are what den -den - denotes? 
BY JAY LOCKHART: The orange stakes are the boundary of the . . . 
BY UNKNOWN: Building envelopes. 
BY JAY LOCKHART: The wetlands. The no build zones. 
BY CHAIRMAN CURRIE: Oh, I thought that was the border of the -of the . . . 
BY JAY LOCKHART: The building envelopes? Those would be pink. 
BY CHAIRMAN CURRIE: Pink? 
BY JAY LOCKHART: Pink. 
(Agency Ti-., p.89-90). 
... 
BY CHAIRMAN CURRIE: So we're going on up the hillside s o  this - from 
those - from those orange all the way across to those orange.. . 
BY COMMISSIONER TONDEE: Those are pink. You think those are orange? 
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BY CHAIRMAN CURRIE: I thought they were. 
BY JAY LOCKHART: Hard to tell. Could be pink. 
BY COMMISSIONER PIAZZA: They look pink to me. 
BY CHAIRMAN CURRIE: Okay. We have pink. I'm voting orange. 
(Agency Tr., pp.95-96). 
Thus, the record establishes that the Board viewed and examined the "wrong objects," as 
a result of its decision to deny Cedar Ridge Homes' representatives the opportunity to be present 
at the May 22, 2007 site visit. By taking affirmative steps to prevent Cedar Ridge Homes from 
being present during the taking of the above-mentioned evidence adduced by the Board during 
the site visit (i.e., the viewing of the survey markers delineating the boundaries of the Meadow, 
building envelopes, and drainfields), the Board frustrated one of the primary purposes behind the 
due process requirement - that the parties be present at a site visit. 
In addition, the Board's actions frustrated the due process requirement set forth in Eacret 
that local zoning bodies provide parties with "the opportunity to rebut facts derived from the visit 
that may come to bear on the ultimate decision. . . ." 139 Idaho at 786, 86 P.3d at 500. In this 
case, the Board adduced evidence (by, among other things, guessing at the colors and 
significance of the survey markers) at the site visit pertaining to boundaries between the 
Meadow, the building envelopes, and the drainfields without giving Cedar Ridge Homes the 
opportunity to be present. Thereafter, on May 3 1, 2007, without taking any further public 
testimony or taking any steps to resolve their apparent confusion with respect to the survey 
makers, the Board voted to deny the Cedar Ridge Homes' Subdivision Application. (Agency 
Tr., pp.113-126). Because Cedar Ridge Homes' representatives were excluded from the May 
22, 2007, site visit, Cedar Ridge Homes had no way to rebut facts derived from the visit, 
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including the Board's erroneous interpretation of the boundary lines and survey markers 
delineating the Meadow area, building envelopes, and the approved drainfields. As a result, the 
Board violated Cedar Ridge Homes' due process rights. 
B. The cases cited to by the Board in its Supplemental Briefing are distinguishable 
from the case at hand, and are not controlling. 
The Board argues that the cases of Tyson Creek R. Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 3 1 Idaho 580, 
174 P. 1004 (1918); Uhrig v. Coffin, 72 Idaho 271,240 P.2d 480 (1952), and Lobdell v. State ex 
rel. Bd o f xghway  Directors, 89 Idaho 559, 407 P.2d 135 (1965) should be controlling in this 
matter, and that this Courts more recent precedents set in Comer and Eacret should simply be 
disregarded. It is the Board's assertion that Tyson Creek, Uhrig, and Lobdell, allow the use of 
observations made during a viewing to enable the decision-making body to apply the evidence 
already in evidence, but specifically prohibits those observations from being used as a substitute 
for evidence not in the record. (Supp. Br. of Respondents, pp.2-7). The Board then submits that 
if that rule is applied to site visits conducted by local zoning bodies as part of a public hearing, 
then its actions of taking affirmative steps to prohibit Cedar Ridge Homes' representative from 
attending the site visit or rebut evidence do not run afoul of due process requirements. (Supp. 
Br. of Respondents, pp.2-7). The Board's argument in this respect is unavailing, as the cases 
relied upon the Board are distinguishable and not controlling in this case. 
As an initial matter, all three of the cases relied upon by the Board are distinguishable 
upon the fact that they address the situation where the finder of fact (i.e., either a judge sitting 
without a jury, or the jury) in a civil trial setting conducts a viewing of the property in question 
aRer the close of evidence but prior to a ruling. See e.g., Lobdell, 89 Idaho at 567, 407 P.2d at 
139 (district judge sitting without a jury in inverse condemnation case made a personal 
CEDAR RIDGE HOMES' SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF: 10 
examination of the premises after the close of evidence, and after the case was fully submitted). 
This case does not involve a fact finder's viewing of a premises after the close of evidence in a 
trial setting, but rather a local zoning body's viewing of a proposed use site as part of a public 
hearing. 
Unlike the cases cited to by the Board where a trier of fact in a civil trial setting views 
property after the close of evidence, in this case the Board viewed the proposed use site as part of 
a public hearing. Indeed, the Board expressly left the public hearing, as well as the record open 
for the purposes of adducing additional evidence: 
BY CHAIRMAN CURRIE: Okay. Thank you. I would entertain a motion to 
close the public hearing unless there is additional information that you might 
need. 
BY COMMISSIONER PIAZZA: Yeah. I got a question of legal. Uh, can we 
close the public hearing and still have a site . . . 
BY JOHN CAFFERTY (County Attorney): No, that would be taking new 
information into the record. You can keep it open for the limited purpose of a site 
visit. Or and let me double check something. I thought you that you commented 
earlier about wanting additional information on square footage of building 
envelopes. 
BY COMMISSIONER PIAZZA: Correct. 
BY JOHN CAFFERTY: And uh some other issues like that. So you might want 
to keep the - I mean if you want to get to other things on the record as well. 
. . . 
BY COMMISSIONER PIAZZA: On Case No. S-842P-06, Cedar Ridge Ranch 
Estates, I'd like to keep the record for the information requested by the - by the 
developer on the number of square feet that uh they delineated for the building 
sites on each lot and also for a site visit to the property. 
(Agency R., pp.77-79). Clearly the Board intended to take new and additional evidence into the 
record, and expressly left the public hearing and the record open for that purpose. The purpose 
of holding a public hearing at the Board level is to directly hear and adduce evidence relative to a 
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propose use site. As such, the situation here is not analogous to the situation where a trial judge, 
after the close of evidence, views the subject property in a civil trial setting. 
Moreover, all three of the cases relied upon by the Board are distinguishable on the 
grounds that they do not address the due process requirements applicable to site visits conduction 
by local zoning bodies, as explicitly set forth by this Court in Comer and Eacret. Specially, the 
requirements that all parties be giving an opportunity to be present at a site visit (1) to insure that 
the zoning body does "not mistakenly view the wrong object or premises," and (2) to provide the 
parties with the opportunity to rebut facts derived by the zoning body firom the visit. Comer, 130 
Idaho at 439,86 P.3d at 563; Eacret, 139 Idaho at 786,86 P.3d at 500. Because the Board failed 
to comply with the due process requirements set forth in Comer and Eacret, the Board violated 
Cedar Ridge Homes' substantial due process rights as well as Idaho Code 3 67-5279(4). 
111. CONCLUSION 
Cedar Ridge Homes respectfully requests that this Court overturn the Board's Order of 
Decision. In addition, Cedar Ridge Homes respectfully requests that this Court grant its requests 
for attorneys' fees and costs. 
DATED this a& day of April, 2009. 
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S. 
MISCHELLE R. FULGHAM, ISB #4623 
PAUL R. HARRINGTON, #7482 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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